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Book Reviews
Lincoln's Manager, David Davis. By Willard L. King.
Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. 383.
$6.75.
There have been one-poem poets and one-novel
novelists, and Mr. Justice David Davis of Maryland and
Illinois may well be called a one-opinion judge. But that
opinion was joined by Justices Nelson, Grier, Clifford and
Field to make it the voice of the majority in Ex ParteMilligan;' and Chief Justice Chase and Justices Wayne, Swayne
and Miller concurred on the main points and in the result.
Milligan, like many other classics, is often mentioned but
less frequently read. Perhaps it is worth while at the
outset of comment on this very good life of Davis to recall
the detail of "what may well be the profoundest adjudication ever to come from the [Supreme Court]" 2 - including Davis' exceptional exertions in the case not only in
the Supreme Court but on circuit.
Lambdin P. Milligan was an Indiana lawyer who held
high rank in the Sons of Liberty, a secret order subsidized
by the Confederate States to subvert the Northern war
effort. Union General Henry B. Carrington, commanding
in Indiana, managed to infiltrate Union agents into the
Sons, and on evidence developed in this way Milligan and.
others were arrested and charged with conspiracy to seize
United States arsenals, release rebel prisoners, arm them
and march with them to join the Southern armies, etc.
Though the civil courts were open and jury process
available in Indiana, Milligan was tried by a military
commission under color of martial law. He was found
'guilty and sentenced to be hanged. He then petitioned
the United States Circuit Court at Indianapolis for habeas
corpus. There sat Justice Davis on circuit and District
Judge David McDonald, recently appointed on recommendation of Davis himself. Davis had frequently stated
his view that military trials like Milligan's were unconstitutional. Yet he realized that were his court to grant the
writ, the commanding general would probably ignore it
and proceed with the execution.
14 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866).
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Davis had a hunch, however, that if the case could
somehow be expedited to the Supreme Court, the military
would hesitate to proceed before a final adjudication. The
rule was that if two judges on circuit disagreed they could
certify the matter to the Supreme Court. Without much
difficulty Davis persuaded the new judge to "disagree"
with -himand three questions went to the Supreme Court.
There arguments opened March 5, 1866. On the last
day of term, April 3, Chief Justice Chase announced the
decision: the writ would issue; Milligan would be turned
over to the civil courts; the military commission was without jurisdiction. The opinions supporting the Court's ruling would be available in December, when the new term
opened.
On December 17, 1866, Mr. Justice Davis announced
for the Court that
"The importance of the main question [here] cannot be over-stated; for it involves the very frame work
the fundamental principles
of the government and
3
of American liberty.
"The Constitution of the United States is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times and under all circumstances. No
doctrine involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of
its provisions [including trial by jury] can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government."4
Davis and the majority went on to an even bolder limitation on military claims - this is where he lost the minority
but as stated, the Court was unanimous on the points
required to decide the case. At once the "radical" Republicans launched one of the historic assaults on the Court, but
Milligan is the law of the land to this day.5
David Davis was born in Cecil County, Maryland,
March 9, 1815, in his grandfather John Mercer's plantation
mansion (still standing) overlooking the Bohemia River.
He graduated from Kenyon College in 1832, studied law
as an office clerk in Lenox, Massachusetts in 1833, entered
what was to become the Yale School of Law at New
0Supra, n. 1, 109.
4 Supra, n. 1, 120-121.
1 E.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30 (1957).
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Haven in 1834 and in 1835 departed for the west to settle
in Illinois. There he succeeded almost at once at the bar
and began the shrewd land speculations which were to
make him an early millionaire. In 1847 he went as a Whig
to the Illinois legislature and in 1848 was elected judge of
the Eighth Illinois circuit, where he served the fourteen
years that were to decide his place in history.
Lawyers on this circuit in Davis' time included a remarkable galaxy of "Plutarchian" figures - Orville H.
Browning, Leonard Swett, Stephen A. Douglas, Lyman
Trumbull, Jesse W. Fell, Abraham Lincoln. With all of
them Davis established easy relations and with Lincoln he
developed an intimate friendship. When in 1860 Lincoln
was a candidate for the presidency on the Republican
Party ticket, it was Davis who put his talent for organization to work in his old friend's behalf. To Davis, in
Fell's opinion, "we are under the greatest obligation for
[Lincoln's] nomination. . . ." It is this relationship which
the biographer chooses to emphasize in his title, and it is
true that Davis was up to his ears in politics, on and off
the court, most of his life. Still, for lawyers, it is the
judicial part of his career which will be of prime interest.
Lincoln nominated his old friend to the Supreme Court
in 1862, and there Davis did conscientious, if somewhat
plodding and not notably scholarly work, for -fifteen years.
His opinions were brief and plain - Milligan alone shone
out. The press of the Court's business increasingly distressed him, but with fruitful results: only less impressively than in Milligan he left his mark in American judicial history by early advocacy of relief through a system
of intermediate appeals; this became law in the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals Act (1891) five years after his
death.6
In 1872, while still on the Court, Davis tried unsuccessfully for the presidential nomination on the liberal Republican ticket. He finally resigned in 1877 when elected to
the Senate from Illinois. Strongly Independent, he held
the balance of power in an even division between Republican and Democratic Senators. He was active all during
these years and later as counsel and advisor of the Lincoln
family, and handled the widow Lincoln's affairs during the
time of her declining sanity.
6Despite the assistance of the Circuit Courts of Appeals the pressure of
Supreme Court business has now intensified to a point comparable to what
It was before the Act of 1891. Cf. Strong, The Need8 of the Supreme Court,
131 North American Review 460 (1881), with Hart, The Time Chart of the
Ju8tices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959).
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Mr. King has told this story of an industrious, zealous,
loyal and just, rather than a gifted or brilliant man, with
steady skill and an avalanche of circumstantial detail.
He has burrowed deeply into the voluminous papers of
Davis, Lincoln, Trumbull, Fell and others, emerging with
new evidence and hitherto unpublished material on many
critical points. He demonstrates pretty well that Lincoln
did not traffic in, cabinet promises to win the Chicago
nomination. He shows that private and contemporary
correspondence greatly alters the story told by Swett in
1887 about the manner of Lincoln's naming 'his old friend
and political manager to the Court. The book carries
an appreciative Foreword by Allan Nevins and will doubtless stand as the definitive biography of a great Maryland
lawyer.
C. P. IVES*

The World of Law. Edited by Ephraim London. New
York. Simon and Schuster, 1960. Two volumes, pp. 1472
$17.50.
These books might well have been called or subtitled
"To the law with love;" for Mr. London, the editor, has
chosen most of the selections from books which one can
well imagine have become his warm friends throughout
his years of reading and study. He shows himself to be
neither overly sanctimonious nor overly sentimental in
his selections, although there is certainly a place for sentiment in this atomic world (it has been said to add- the
flavor to life). His tastes show a remarkable catholicity,
and although it is easy to accuse him of some small sins
of exclusion or inclusion, the general effect of the books is
calculated to give the reader a rich varied experience,
a sweeping view over the centuries of the pageant of law
and literature. Here one can find in full measure pictures
of "the trial," sometimes replete with trickery, sometimes
with tactical brilliance, always with drama and excitement; gray pictures of "the cowed and meek"; bright pictures of the paupers who have fought the good fight for
justice equal to that accorded to the princes. Elsewhere
* A.B. 1925, Brown University: M.A. 1938, Yale University: Editorial
Staff, The Sun, Baltimore.
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in the selections one can find profound analyses of the
judicial process in the words of Hand, Cardozo, Brandeis,
and others; and one finds also the unbelievably passionate
and courageous words of Gandhi, Joan of Arc, and Zola.
In the words of the dust jacket, "Here are those who
practice the law, and here are those who preach it; those
who make it and those who break it; those who write it
and those who write about it." The two volumes are called
respectively The Law in Literature and The Law as Literature. One suspects that this was merely a convenient
dichotomy so that it would be possible for the publisher to
produce two separate volumes of portable weight, for
the distinction is a tenuous one and there is a constant
blending and cross-fertilization of the two categories
throughout the two volumes. As to another distinction',
Mr. London quotes Disraeli in his Introduction to the
effect that that complex dandy-author-statesman was depressed by the law but exalted by literature. The editor
questions the validity of this glib distinction and seems to
have presented us with these books to prove his point.
Here is a happy blending that adds even more richness
to the meaty archives of each. He says in concluding his
Introduction, "It was my intent to present a gathering or
collection of writing centered in the Law, each of such
excellence that it may be described as literature."
Somewhere in Gilbert and Sullivan (also represented
in The World of Law) one finds the statement that "the
law is the embodiment of everything that's excellent."
One suspects that the Lerner and Loewe of their age
probably used the statement more for purposes of rhyme
than for any other reason, for it is far from accurate and
gives a false picture of the often maligned profession
which we follow. The law has it errors, its imperfections,
its delays, and its frustrations. Our trials have their
ridiculous aspects; the adversary nature of the trial has
been severely criticized; we see all kinds of perjury ranging from the subconscious delusory type to the wilful
purposive type; in many places politics enters and causes
a shattering of the law school ideals. But from the Sermon
on the Mount through the Magna Carta to Learned. Hand's
address on Liberty there is much of which we can be justifiably proud. The progress of the humble individual man
at least toward some degree of dign-ity and personal security, in a way parallel to the progress of man, towards
physical health brought about by the medical profession,
is the true glory and majesty of the Law. And these
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things are shown throughout the book, with a bright light
illuminating the good and bad of the law, its saints and
sinners.
Mr. London shows unfailing good taste and a fine sense
of variety in his choices of the various gems. In addition to several already mentioned, no picture of the book
would be of value without listing some others: Damon
Runyon's keyhole view of the somewhat salacious divorce
trial of "Daddy" and "Peaches" Browning; Mencken's
knothole view of the Scopes trial; Frankfurter's sharp
analysis of the Sacco-Vanzetti trial, with its dubious result still the subject of research and soul-searching; Camus'
devastating condemnation of capital punishment; and
many others. One's literary memory is jogged. One is
reminded of the tragedy of Camus' early death by the
excellence of this piece. And Frankfurter's essay recalls
the two sonnets of Edna St. Vincent Millay on the SaccoVanzetti trial, which one would like to 'have seen as a
sort of footnote to the main article"As men have loved their lovers in time past
And sung their wit, their virtue and their grace,
So have we loved sweet Justice to the last,
Who now lies here in an unseemly place."
There are other items in these galleries - miniatures
like an O'Henry short story and Frankfurter's Advice to
a Young Man and a poem by Auden; and larger paintings
done in broad slashing De Kooning strokes with deep
colors, like Darrow's summation in the Sweet case (perhaps the Loeb-Leopold summation has been overworked),
and Mr. Justice Jackson's Nuremberg summation, so timely
with the Eichmann case now in progress. As we read
the eloquent closing sentence of Jackson's long statement,
the pictures of the trial and the memories of the tragic
Nazi blot on modern civilization rush back into our recollection: "If you were to say of these men that they are not
guilty, it would be as true to say that there has been no
war, there are no slain, there has been no crime." And
there is a sort of companion piece to this - Rebecca West's
unbelievably photographic recounting of the Nuremberg
trial. There is humor too - in the form of Dickens'
Daumier-like writings, in A. P. Herbert, in a selection from
Lewis Carroll's Alice, in Mark Twain's work and in
Balzac's. Drama in the more conventional sense is repre-
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sented by a selection from The Winslow Boy; -by Wouk's
Caine Mutiny, a picture of the psychopathic Queeg; and
by others throughout the two bulging volumes.
For the most part these books leave the reader with
an emotional impact. But there is also a tremendous intellectual stimulation giving rise to new thoughts and
dynamic new ways of thinking out the problems of
modern life and particularly modern courts. One thread
which seems to run through the whole tapestry of the
books gives a picture throughout history of the development of the "adversary" and often "combat" type of trial
which we at least of the Anglo-American tradition have
come to know. We see the changes which have occurred
over the years. We see the growth of trial by jury and
we can almost feel the growth of what has been called the
gnarled oak of the common law. We have come far since
trial by combat and trial by 'ordeal. We have seen the
development of pre-trial techniques, the burgeoning of
administrative agencies, and the relaxation of the strict
rules of evidence. As Jerome Frank points out in the
selection from Courts on Trial and quoting Wigmore, the
contentious trial method "has contributed to lower the
system of administering justice and in particular of ascertaining truth in litigation, to the level of a mere game of
chance .. "
Another common theme running through the books is
one which gives some insight into the mysteries of the
nebulous profession of judging, what Learned Hand calls
somewhere the "awful task" of judging. Mencken defined
a judge as "a law student who can now mark his own
examination paper." But to explain how a decision is born
is not simple. Cardozo attempts it 'but modestly says that
his beautifully reasoned prose is merely an attempt "to
state the formula." In the selection from The Nature of
the JudicialProcesshe begins:
"The work of deciding cases goes on every day in
hundreds of courts throughout the land. Any judge,
one might suppose, would find it easy to describe the
process which he had followed a hundred times and
more. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Let
some intelligent layman ask him to explain: he will
not go very far before taking refuge in the excuse that
the language of craftsmen is unintelligible to those
untutored in the craft...."
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Mr. London is obviously devoted to his profession and
his devotion is contagious. We lawyers have no succinct
oath analogous to the Hippocratic oath of the physicians.
Being essentially garrulous people, the lawyers perhaps
need many "words, words, words," but the total impact
of the words found in these books is to bring forth a
sense of exaltation, not a self-satisfied sense of perfection,
not a feeling that "all's right with the world," but a comfortable knowledge that in spite of Hummel and Howe
and their counterparts we also have Holmes and the Hands
and their counterparts. These are the people who superimpose on cold legalism a structure which includes
philosophical, economic, and sociological elements. The
Law is far from an exact science and, in the words- of
Holmes, "it cannot be dealt with as if it contained the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." This
type of thinking, fortunately widespread among the profession, is one of the greatnesses of the Law. This spirit
too pervades the pages of these volumes.
The editor is a practicing attorney who participated in
the Nazi trials after having served in the Army in World
War II. He has also taken part in a number of important
Supreme Court cases. He has constructed his books with
flavor and tone and they can be read with pleasure and
edification by all.
HENRY L. ROGERS*
* A.B. 1939, Yale University; LLJ3. 1948, University of Maryland School
of Law; Associate Judge, People's Court of Baltimore City.

